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Resumen—Upcoming smart scenarios enabled by the In-
ternet of Things (IoT) envision smart objects that expose
services that can adapt to user behaviour or be managed
for higher productivity. In such environments, smart things
are cheap and, therefore, constrained devices. However, they
are also critical components because of the importance of
the information they provide. Therefore, strong security
is a must, but not all access control models are feasible.
In this paper, we propose the feasibility assessment of an
access control model that deals with a hybrid architecture
and a policy language that provides dynamic fine-grained
policy enforcement in the sensors, which requires an efficient
message exchange protocol called Hidra. This experimental
performance assessment conveys a prototype implementation,
a performance evaluation model, the measurements and the
related discussions, which demonstrate the feasibility and
adequacy of the analysed access control model.
Palabras Clave—access control, authorization policy lan-
guage, constrained device, Internet of Things, security
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) concept conceives an
interconnected network of things, the smarter the better,
contributing to a higher awareness, enhanced decision
making, and more adaptive behaviour of systems sup-
porting any business process integrating pervasive and
ubiquitous ICT technologies. IoT also implies a massive
deployment of sensors and actuators, which, aiming at
being cheap, are implemented in a range of constrained
devices, constrained device sensors (CDSs) from now on,
classified according to IETF [1], from severely constrained
C0 to less constrained C2. Moreover, depending on the use
case and location, they may require power autonomy, and
therefore, require low power consumption mechanisms.
In such IoT applications, security (more specifically,
access control) remains an insufficiently solved problem
since existing approaches are challenged by divergent
properties as tightness and feasibility. Consequently, in this
paper, we propose the feasibility assessment of an access
control model based on an expressive policy language
enabling tight enforcement in CDSs. Such access control
model includes a protocol that enables secure provisioning
and enforcement of dynamic security policies as well
as an audit trail, and this protocol is the subject of
the performance evaluation driven through a prototype
implementation.
Beyond the traditional producer behaviour of CDSs,
which publish measurements and events to message bro-
kers, in more advanced IoT scenarios, CDSs behave as
tiny information servers. Specifically, requesting clients
directly query the tiny CDS servers, establishing a secure
end-to-end (E2E) communication. These exposed services
enable usage, operation, maintenance and manageability
of CDSs over their entire life-cycle and protect the value
stream of the connected objects. For example, an end-
user can access directly to tune personal parameters such
as gender, age, weight, etc. in a health constant monitor-
ing sensor. Moreover, the use of intermediary proxies is
avoided because on one hand, they are specific for each
protocol or application and are not flexible enough, and
on the other hand, breaking the security association into
two or more sub-transmissions might not be considered
acceptable from a security point of view.
Fig. 1 shows an IoT schema that conveys different roles
in various domains, operating, monitoring and controlling
related business process through applications and fully
aligned with the functional decomposition view of the IoT
architecture reference model (ARM) [2].
In this context, the accuracy and correctness of the
information exchanged with CDSs is crucial. Protecting
this information requires the implementation of appropri-
ate security mechanisms that include fine-grained access
control mechanisms based on expressive policies and
that can guarantee essential security properties such as
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and non-
repudiation [3], [4], [5]. However, implementing these
appropriate security mechanisms in resource-constrained
CDSs is not straightforward. Currently, one of the key









































Fig. 1: Scenario schema where several stakeholders
playing different roles access IoT applications on dif-
ferent IoT domains. The core shows the functional
decomposition view of the IoT reference architecture,
where security functional group is highlighted.
the availability of feasible access control solutions. More-
over, due to the extremely dynamic nature and purpose
of applications based on services in sensors, policy-based
security must be enforced locally in the CDSs, where
resources are scarce.
The main contribution of this paper is a feasibility
assessment of such a highly expressive E2E access control
model in severely constrained devices (C0 and C1 CDSs),
based on an experimental performance evaluation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related
works are presented in Section II as the state of the art. The
proposed access control model is specified in Section III.
The performance evaluation conveying an experimental
prototype is discussed in Section IV. Finally, the main
conclusions of the paper are presented in Section V.
II. STATE OF THE ART
In the last years, the research area related to security
in IoT has received a significant attention, dealing with
the design of different architectures, security protocols
and policy models. But security still remains as the main
obstacle in the development of innovative and valuable
services [3]. In fact, traditional security countermeasures
cannot be applied directly to CDSs in IoT scenarios,
because they are too resource consuming and not opti-
mized for resource deprived devices. Additionally, existing
feasible E2E access control approaches do not implement
an expressive and therefore fine-grained and tight security
policy enforcement [6].
For feasibility reasons, a centralized architecture based
on traditional standards and protocols, where a central
access control server (ACS) with no resource constraints
makes authorization decisions for each access request,
could be initially a possible option. But this approach
does not consider local context conditions in CDSs, and
it implies high energy consumption as well as network
overhead due to continuous communications between the
CDSs and the ACS.
A recent alternative approach is the distributed ca-
pability based access control (DcapBAC) [7], where an
unforgeable token exchangeable as a capability, grants
access to its holder in a more agile way. However, the
token is designed in a XML schema and it has not been
validated in constrained devices.
In any case, this approach has been adopted by some
other designs involving technologies specifically defined
for IoT, which enable CDSs to make local authorization
decisions based also on local conditions [8], since the
capabilities might include conditions represented as tuples
(type, name, value). Per contra, this approach is based
on public key cryptography (PKC) which is heavier than
symmetric key cryptography (SKC) by means of resource
consumption. Additionally, the conditions are limited to
matching because the approach does not support expres-
sions. Moreover, its syntax is not optimized by means
of codification since it uses JSON, it does not support
the enforcement of additional obligations and it has been
validated in not so constrained C2 devices.
In this line, the delegated CoAP [9] authentication and
authorization framework (DCAF) [10] defines a token to
distribute pre-shared keys, and if authorized, a handshake
is done to establish a DTLS channel. Local authorization
policies are specified as conditions serialized in a concise
binary object representation (CBOR), instead of JSON,
aiming at compacted payloads in CoAP protocol. But
CBOR is a general purpose serialization solution [11] and
the resulting compression is not sufficiently optimized for
security policies in very constrained C0 and C1 devices,
where fine-grained access control is aimed through a
higher but feasible policy language expressiveness, beyond
the conditions consisting of simple constant matching of
existing local attributes.
In other line, the usage control model and the attribute
based policy schema [12] extend traditional access control
systems to a continuous protection of the resource during
access by the definition of obligations to enforce usage
control. However, there is not an approach addressing the
feasibility in CDSs.
Finally, attending to the protocols for the instant provi-
sioning of the policy during the E2E security association
in a secure session, Ladon [13], which is inspired in
Kerberos, is susceptible to be evolved for that purpose. In
fact, Ladon is specifically designed for very constrained
devices, but it does not directly support the provisioning
of an expressive policy.
Consequently, currently no suitable solution exists to
provide authentication and fine-grained authorization pro-
cesses in the envisioned scenarios of constrained but man-
ageable sensor networks, and additionally, neither of the
above considered approaches implements any accounting
feature.
III. ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
The E2E access control model subject of feasibility
assessment is based on an efficient policy language and
codification, which are specifically defined to gain ex-
pressiveness in the authorization policies and to keep
the viability in very constrained devices. Besides the
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{ "id" : byte , "effect" : DENY
PERMIT
, "ruleset" : [ rule ] }
Fig. 2: Policy construct definition.
{ "id" : byte , "effect" : DENY
PERMIT
, "periodicity" : byte






"conditionset" : [ expression ] , "obligationset" : [ obligation ] }
Fig. 3: Rule construct definition.
policy language, the access control model conveys the
E2E feasible security association between two mutually
authenticated peers, and consists of an architecture to
enable multi-step authorization as well as a protocol for
the provisioning and enforcement of a dynamic security
policy in the CDSs.
A. Authorization policy language and codification
In this section, an expressive policy language is briefly
presented. The goal of this policy language is to enable
the enforcement of tighter access control policies in CDSs,
overcoming the resource constraints. In fact, this policy
language definition enables both to make granting de-
cisions based on local context conditions, and to react
accordingly to the requests by the execution of additional
tasks defined as obligations.
A resulting policy instance is defined, like in the general
event-condition-action approaches, as an optional set of
rules, which specifies both the conditions to be checked
and the related reactions, in enforcement time. Specifically,
this policy language stands for a sequence of constructs
with particular meaning in the decision making and en-
forcement time.
Some of the constructs are defined as mandatory, and
some others as optional, enabling to shorten the length
of the policy when a simple policy is enough. Addition-
ally, some constructs are extended through other nested
constructs, and some of them can be instantiated many
times within a container construct. Related to this elasticity
feature, the more constructs, the higher the expressiveness
of the policy, so the more granular the policy is, and
consequently, the tighter the enforcement is. Consequently,
the challenge to overcome is to be feasible even in the most
expressive use-case.
The policy language enables a policy instantiation
through the policy construct, with three nested constructs
as depicted in Fig. 2. First of all, a policy instance
identification, id, is specified for logging, tracking and
auditing purposes. Then, a default policy granting effect
is specified. This effect will prevail in the case of absence
of rules, or any rule evaluation conflict. Lastly, optionally,
an array of rules may be instantiated as a ruleset to specify
the conditions and related reactions. Each rule in the array
is an extensible construct.
The rule construct depicted in Fig. 3 is defined as a
sequence of eight nested constructs, where the order is
crucial. Some of them, such as id, effect, and conditionset
are mandatory, and the rest named periodicity, iteration,
resource, action and obligationset are optional. The condi-
tionset and the obligationset are arrays of expressions and
obligations respectively. These repeatable and extensible
expression and obligation constructs are defined in a
similar way enabling the instantiation of rich expressions
on attributes declared as inputs as well as reactive tasks
declared as obligations.
The length of any policy instance, in a human readable
format, grows proportionally with the aimed tightness,
and it would impact negatively in the performance. So a
specific policy instance codification is considered, distin-
guishing from existing ones that serialize policy instances
through standardized generalist solutions such as CBOR.
The considered policy codification serializes each con-
struct and concatenates them in a bit stream. In fact,
it takes profit of beforehand knowledge of the defined
sequence of the constructs, and their format. An additional
crucial factor is the injection of some agreed bit masks,
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Fig. 4: Performance evaluation scenario. Hidra protocol messages and security association establishment
related authentication, authorization, key exchange and notifications.
to specify the existence or not of optional constructs. It
enables to deal optimally with the elasticity defined in the
policy language, avoiding unused but expected fields of
expressive policies, greatly reducing the length.
With respect to covered policy formats, this policy
codification can easily be applied to any original policy
instance format (XACML, JSON, etc.), from textual files
to structured policy instance representations. For example,
four different instances of sample policies in the testlab,
represented in JSON with lengths of 23, 118, 174 and 554
bytes, which are codified in CBOR with lengths of 14, 81,
123 and 391 bytes respectively, are notably reduced to 2,
7, 9, and 32 bytes using the considered codification.
B. Hidra messaging protocol
In order to efficiently convey the presented access con-
trol policies to the CDSs, the Hidra protocol is considered.
Hidra, depicted in Fig. 4, is based on a three parties
architecture, and provides authentication, authorization in
two steps, dynamic policy provisioning and accounting.
Hidra is based on Ladon [13], which is a validated
solution for the establishment of E2E security associations,
through pair-wise keys, guaranteeing mutual authentica-
tion and authorization in very CDSs.
Both Hidra and Ladon are based on symmetric key
cryptography and they assume that each endpoint owns
a secret key shared with the ACS. The operation is based
on the use of tickets, a capability distributed by the ACS
that contains a proof of the identity of the subject that
requests it. Tickets are encrypted so that only the entities
which they are intended for, are able to decrypt them.
After a successful authentication in the ACS (Phase 1)
the subject that wants to access a service in the CDS
obtains a ticket granting ticket (TGT). This TGT is used
by the subject to obtain resource tickets (Phase 2) required
to access any resource on the CDSs.
This approach enables the attribute based access control
(ABAC) authorization enforcement in two steps. On the
first one, as condition to release any resource ticket, fine-
grained preliminary access control is performed in the
ACS (Phase 2), focusing on the attributes of the subject,
resource and expected actions. If this first authorization
step is successful, the ACS sends a message to the subject
including a resource ticket, and also sends a message
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to the CDS conveying an expressive authorization policy
instance. This instantaneous custom policy provisioning
avoids permanent policies’ storage in the CDS and reduces
network overhead comparing with approaches enclosing
the policy in the resource ticket.
On the second authoritative step, once the subject has
obtained a resource ticket, the local context based access
control is performed in the CDS (Phase 3). First, the
proper rule is evaluated to make the granting decision, and
then the corresponding reactive actions are enforced. In a
positive authorization case, the result is a shared session
key to be used on further E2E resource access exchanges.
Another novelty of Hidra with respect to Ladon is
the addition of a pair of messages to enable precise
accounting (Phase 4). By means of these messages, the
CDS will notify details like who performed what, where
and when in each and every access request received from
the subject. These notifications are gathered, normalized,
and treated properly by the ACS. Additionally, the ACS
can react and send a related policy message, enabling the
dynamic delegation, request, cancellation and revocation
of permissions.
Then, while the security association is not finalized, the
access control is enforced in the CDS autonomously in
each and every further request attempt, since the received
expressive policy (Phase 2) includes related rules.
Consequently, unified, coherent and adaptive manage-
ment of the policies by the ACS is achieved. Additionally,
the proposed Hidra protocol and the adopted architecture
enable to rely the most expensive features on the ACS,
which entails the usage of standard security and access
control technologies in the non constrained interactions. It
also achieves that most unauthorized access attempts are
refused before reaching the CDS, avoiding unsuccessful
message exchanges and thus, saving energy in the CDS,
which is a crucial aspect.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the experimental performance analysis
of an access control model for E2E security in CDSs
is carried out conveying the establishment of a security
association between a requesting subject and a CDS.
For performance analysis there are three main options:
analytical evaluation, specific network simulation and
prototype implementation. Even though this third one
is more complex and expensive, this proposal conveys
an Hidra protocol implementation prototype in order to
present more accurate and realistic performance results.
Therefore, the performance analysis covers the measuring
and evaluation of the crucial performance parameters of
such resource constrained sensing environments.
First, the reference scenario, some assumptions and its
implementation through software codification and con-
figurations are discussed. Then, the crucial performance
parameters are identified, and their measurement methods
and computation are described. Finally, an analysis of the
measurements is presented, describing and discussing the
evaluation results.
The overall goal is to demonstrate the suitability of the
designed access control model for CDSs in the envisioned
scenarios.
A. Test-bed implementation
The testing scenario for the performance evaluation
is graphically depicted in Fig. 4. In this scenario, a
subject is connected to the Internet and establishes an
E2E connection with a resource running on a CDS in an
IEEE 802.15.4 network. A 6LoWPAN router (in orange)
acts as the LowPAN coordinator and connects a beacon-
enabled lineal structure to the Internet. The IEEE 802.15.4
network is 2-hops deep, which is considered significantly
large for validation purposes. The PAN router coordinator
has a child coordinator implemented in a TelosB [14]
sensor, which controls one leaf node. In this node the
CDS exposes resources as management services, and it is
implemented in an C0 hardware platform IRIS [15] sensor
with Contiki OS [16].
In the implementation two aspects are distinguished: on
one hand, network protocols and connectivity, and on the
other, Hidra messaging protocol as an application.
Fig. 4 shows implemented protocol stacks in all entities
involved in the performance evaluation scenario. The im-
plemented network enables E2E IPv6 connectivity through
a multi-hop IEEE 802.15.4 sensor network, in 2.4 GHz
band. Note that IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks (RPL) [17] is configured to set a multi-
hop hierarchical node network with neighbour discovery
functionalities within the IEEE 802.15.4 network. The
network configuration is done through sensor ID setting
and registration as a first step, and then UDP messaging
module is installed.
Then, Hidra messaging protocol application is made by
different software modules covering different functions in
each of the three parties involved in the protocol: subject,
ACS, and sensor.
Hidra in the sensor side, which means the biggest
impact, is codified and installed as a server application
on top of Contiki OS. In fact, it receives an indication and
a policy from the ACS, and a request from the subject. So
it checks the validity of the messages, the identities and
the service ticket, prior to evaluating the policy locally
and making a granting decision related to the security
association establishment requested by the subject. Finally,
it notifies any activity to the ACS through log messages
for further tracking and auditing.
This sensor side Hidra module implements also an
unique UDP socket to wait for any of the possible mes-
sages in order to be more efficient in memory footprint.
Once a received message is identified, it is parsed and
proper protocol related checks, validations and reactions
are performed following an specific flow.
During development some design decisions were made.
Specifically, where message authentication codes (MACs)
are 16 bytes long; message cyphering is done with AES-
128 and it is combined with Ciphertext Stealing algo-
rithm to avoid size increments with respect to cleartext
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messages. Cryptographic libraries are TomCrypt and tiny-
AES-128 [18].
B. Performance modelling
To conduct a performance evaluation of the proposed
access control model for E2E security in CDSs, the
experimental performance model focuses on three critical
parameters: (1) the response time of the access control
model to establish an authorized E2E secure session, (2)
the energy cost of this model for the protected CDS
running on finite batteries, (3) the model’s impact on the
local storage on the CDS and memory footprint.
The response time needs to be below an accepted value
if the proposal is to be useful, and the energy consumption,
local storage, and memory footprint, due to the nature of
the CDSs and their constraints on resources, cannot exceed
rational and proportional limits.
1) Response time: During the establishment of a secu-
rity association, five messages are exchanged, as detailed
in Section III.B. This response time includes the steps
where the subject requests and obtains the service ticket,
the notification that the ticket is granted, policy provision-
ing in the CDS by the ACS, and the security association
request and response between the subject and the CDS.
In order to measure this time, some few code lines
are inserted in the subject’s side software code, setting
two timestamps: one at the beginning of the security
association establishment and the other at the end of this
establishment.
2) Energy consumption: Regarding the energy cost
measurement, the energy consumed by the transmission
and reception of bits over the air and the message pro-
cessing are considered.
For the measurement of the processing energy consump-
tion, two timestamps are inserted in the sensor’s side, at the
beginning and the end of the message processing software
code. Once measured the time to process each message, a
constant instantaneous power consumption (PC) provided
by the manufacturer in the datasheet is considered in order
to compute the energy consumption of each message.
For the computation of the power consumption due to
the transmission and reception of each message, involved
message lengths in bytes and packet fragmentation are
computed (considering 50 bytes of longest IEEE 802.15.4
plus UDP/6LowPAN headers). According to Ladon pro-
tocol message lengths [13], in which Hidra protocol is
based, the lengths of the messages exchanged during the
authentication and authorization protocol range from 15
to 63 bytes. Enclosing the policy in the HID CM IND
message (33 bytes), which is one of the smallest, implies
the minimum fragmentation of 6LowPAN IPv6 packets
over IEEE 802.15.4 links. This design decision makes a
difference with respect to the approaches for enclosing the
policy in the ticket, which is included with larger request
messages. Therefore, it can be anticipated a proportional
and optimized impact in the length of a message from
injecting the compressed policy into the shortest one. In
particular, the length of the instantiated policy in this
Tabla I: Parameters used to characterise the energy con-
sumption of sensor nodes
Name Description Value
BN Effective network wireless link data bit rate 70Kbps
PRX Power consumption in reception mode 48 mW
PTX Power consumption in transmission mode (3dBm) 51 mW
PC Power consumption in message processing mode 8 mW
proposal is 2 bytes and consequently, the total length of
the HID CM IND message is 35 bytes.
Additionally, constant reception and transmission power
consumption rates provided by the manufacturer in the
data-sheet and a constant propagation bit rate are also
considered. Table I shows testlab real-conditions (non-
optimal) network data bit rate and the different instan-
taneous power consumption values used for the analysis.
Note that these power consumption values correspond to
a MEMSIC IRIS mote (XM2110CA) powered with a 3V
power supply [15].
Finally, the power consumption is calculated as the
sum of the individual power consumptions of each of the
involved messages in the sensor.
3) Storage and memory footprint: In this subsection,
the increase of permanent storage and the memory foot-
print generated by the proposed access control model are
considered. Specifically, the storage and memory footprint
for the instant provisioning of a received access control
policy and the code needed to parse it, as well as the data
blocks related to the messages of the Hidra protocol, are
considered together.
On one hand, regarding the permanent storage for the
mentioned entities, the symmetric key shared with the
ACS, the access control policy, the code to parse the
received policy and the code to run the Hidra protocol are
considered the additional minimum entities that should be
permanently stored in a CDS along with some original
resources and sensing applications.
On the other hand, regarding the memory footprint, the
data required for the Hidra protocol message exchange
are considered: namely, the session keys shared with the
subject, the subject identity, the different data needed to
identify the messages and to guarantee their freshness, the
lifetime of the security association, and the log of each
access provisionally wrapped until the reception of the
acknowledgement from the ACS. However, some of these
values are loaded and erased during the reception, process-
ing and transmission of relatively consecutive messages.
Measurement of code plus data storage and memory
footprint is done through a particular command (size),
which provides with both static and dynamic occupied
memory amounts.
C. Performance analysis
In this section, the measurement results obtained on the
experimental prototype described in the previous section
are used to analyse the mean response time and energy
consumption to establish a secure session, as well as the
impact on the local storage and memory footprint. Re-
sponse time and energy consumption have been measured
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Fig. 5: Response time of security association establishment
considering 80 requests in two network configurations: one
and two hops.
by 80 samples, so potential measuring error is reduced.
Additionally, response time has been measured with two
different configurations: one hop and two hops respec-
tively, so the impact of the intermediate node insertion
can be measured.
1) Response time: First, impact of Hidra on perfor-
mance is conveyed measuring response time of 80 sub-
ject’s security association establishment requests, consid-
ering both network configurations: with one and two hops.
Fig. 5 shows that the maximum response time, even
with a non-optimal network bit rate, is below 420ms
and 637ms in both network configurations. This value
is very good, considering that the maximum acceptable
delay in interactive E2E data transactions specified by
Stallings [19] is 1000ms.
Fig. 5 showing a composition of the measurements with
two configurations, points out that a second hop increases
proportionally 200ms on average. This value could also
be considered as referential increment per hop for further
estimations aiming at large scale deployments.
Additionally, one related comparable response time
value has been found in the literature, although there is
no mention of additional performance indicators such as
energy consumption. At the C2 level, [20] reveals that the
comparable measured response time for the authorization
response starting when the subject sends the request is
480.96ms (with one hop). The response time of Hidra is
lower even with a worse network bit rate and, therefore,
better.
2) Energy consumption: Attending to the impact of
Hidra protocol on the energy consumption Fig. 6 shows
measured values of power consumption related to each of
80 requests as well as the average.
This figure shows that the measured average value of
power consumption is 0, 3985µAh, which is a very low
value. This very good result means that impact of Hidra
in energy consumption is very low. In the case of two
AAA batteries of 900mAh, suming up to 1800mAh,
considering a 95% of battery performance, makes a real
Fig. 6: Energy consumption in security association estab-
lishment considering 80 requests in an one-hop network
configuration.
capacity of 1710mAh. Therefore, more than 4 millions
(4,291,006) of requests could be handled during the battery
life.
In the envisioned scenario, the CDS is accessed by
the subject to perform tasks such as personalization,
parametrization, updating, upgrading, maintenance, and
so on. These types of interactions do not occur often.
As the most exigent scenario, we can consider one that
requests access every hour to tune the user experience in
an application where the users change hourly.
In this most exigent scenario, a subject making one
request per hour, 24 per day, 8760 per year, could get
response for approximately 490 years (489.840) of the
battery life. Therefore, Hidra’s energy consumption could
be deprecated, and the battery life would depend basically
on the main purpose application of the CDS.
3) Storage and memory footprint: Finally, from the
storage point of view, at the CDS, the amount of RAM
memory is the most limiting aspect, compared with per-
manent storage, which is usually an order of magnitude
larger.
Assuming that measures are dependent on programming
style, measurements of storage occupancy are 20836 bytes,
and memory footprint is 1440 bytes. Therefore, the impact
is considered acceptable considering available 128KB and
8KB of flash and RAM memory in so constrained devices
such as the ones used in the implementation [15].
V. CONCLUSION
Incoming smart scenarios enabled by IoT envision smart
objects exposing services to be adapted to user experience
or to be managed aiming at higher productivity, often
in multi-stakeholder applications. In such environments,
smart things are cheap, therefore constrained devices, but
they are also critical components, so security is a must.
Existent approaches coping with the principle of least
privilege, based on the expressiveness and updating of the
policy to be enforced in the sensors, are challenged by
feasibility constraints.
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The proposed performance evaluation is focused on an
innovative access control model dealing with a hybrid ar-
chitecture and a policy language for dynamic fine-grained
policy enforcement in the sensor. Such policy enforcement
is based on local context conditions and correspondent
obligations, not only during secure session establishment
but also afterwards while the security association is in
use, in order to control the behaviour of the access.
Such a dynamic policy cycle avoiding local storage, is
enabled by an efficient message exchange protocol, named
Hidra. Actually the Hidra protocol assures the mutual
authentication, the expressive policy injection, the tight
policy enforcement in the secure association establishment
and the derived resource access, as well as the accounting
for further tracking and auditing purposes.
The proposed feasibility assessment is based on a proto-
type implementation of such an innovative access control
model in very constrained devices. The experimental per-
formance analysis focusing on three key performance indi-
cators such as the response time, the power consumption
and the memory footprint outcomes remarkable results.
Based on these measurements, the performance evaluation
of this proposal concludes the feasibility of this analysed
access control model on resource constrained sensors.
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